The Bangladesh Garment Industry, 1947 to 2026 · Chapter 3 of 13 · 1974 to 2004
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement and Bangladesh: The Quota Years, 1974 to 2004
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) governed world trade in textiles and clothing from 1974: it was "a framework for bilateral agreements or unilateral actions that established quotas limiting imports", used by developed countries against efficient producers in developing countries, particularly in Asia.1 Because quotas held back restricted exporters, buyers and producers moved to countries that were not yet restricted, and Bangladesh's export garment industry grew in that gap, from US$31.57 million of exports in FY1983-84 to US$6.42 billion in FY2004-05.2 The WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing phased the quotas out from 1995 and ended them on 1 January 2005; against forecasts of heavy losses, Bangladesh's garment exports did not decline.3
- 1974
- Year the Multi-Fibre Arrangement began to govern trade in textiles and clothing4
- 1985
- Year the United States first put quotas on Bangladeshi clothing, after exports rose to US$150 million, 1 per cent of the US market, on the World Bank's figures5
- 4 July 1995
- Date BGMEA, the ILO and UNICEF signed the memorandum of understanding on child labour6
- 9,546
- Children under 14 found in garment factories by the first MOU survey, August to November 19957
- 1 January 2005
- Date the last quotas ended and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ceased to exist8
- US$6.42bn
- Bangladesh's ready-made garment exports in FY2004-05, 74.15 per cent of all exports9
Sources: WTO; World Bank (2005); UNICEF and ILO (2004); ILO-IPEC (2004); BGMEA export data.10
What was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement?
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement was the international framework under which importing countries limited imports of textiles and clothing by quota, from 1974 until the end of the Uruguay Round of trade talks.11 The WTO describes it as "a framework for bilateral agreements or unilateral actions that established quotas limiting imports".12 Quotas were quantitative restrictions: they capped quantities instead of charging a duty, and the WTO notes that they conflicted with the general preference of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for tariffs over quantitative restrictions, and with its principle of equal treatment of trading partners.13
The World Bank describes the MFA as instituted in 1974 "by the developed countries to protect their own textile and apparel industry against competition from the more efficient producers in developing countries, particularly in Asia".14 Quotas applied to developing countries that exported significant quantities.15 A country whose exports were still small could ship without a quota until its sales grew large enough to attract one.16
The system had effects its designers did not intend. Quotas on efficient producers forced importers and retailers to source from many less efficient countries, and producers in quota-restricted countries shifted production to countries that were not yet restricted; the World Bank notes that many developing countries started garment manufacturing as a result.17 Quotas also had a price. The World Bank treats the quota premium as working like an export tax, and says that the fall in Chinese prices after quotas were abolished reflected the disappearance of that premium.18
Trade kept growing under the quotas. World apparel exports roughly doubled between 1993 and 2003, from about US$90 billion to US$180 billion in nominal terms, and exports from low- and middle-income countries rose from US$53 billion to US$123 billion, a 70 per cent share of the total.19 In 1995 the MFA was replaced by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which brought the sector back under ordinary GATT rules over ten years.20
How did the quota system help Bangladesh's garment industry grow?
The quota system helped Bangladesh by restricting its competitors while it was itself still unrestricted. According to the World Bank, the first major export-oriented garment venture in Bangladesh was set up "soon after the coming into force of MFA in collaboration with Daewoo, a large garment manufacturer of a quota-restricted country, South Korea".21 That partnership, with Desh Garments, is the subject of the chapter on Desh Garments and Daewoo.
The World Bank concludes that MFA quotas "provided sheltered market access to Bangladesh garment exports to US and EU, prompting the growth and expansion of an entire industry".22 The industry's own association agrees. BGMEA writes: "The MFA-quota was a blessing to our industry to take root, gradually develop and mature."23 The World Bank also credits two domestic policies: bonded warehouses, introduced in the early 1980s, and back-to-back letters of credit. Imported inputs could make up more than 65 per cent of the cost of a garment.24
Export figures show how fast the industry grew. Ready-made garment (RMG) exports rose from US$31.57 million in FY1983-84 to US$116.2 million in FY1984-85 and US$298.67 million in FY1986-87.25 They passed US$1 billion in FY1991-92, at US$1,182.57 million.26 Garments first made up more than half of Bangladesh's exports in FY1990-91, at 50.47 per cent, and more than three-quarters in FY1998-99, at 75.67 per cent.27 The only year of decline between FY1983-84 and FY2004-05 was FY2001-02, when exports fell 5.7 per cent, from US$4,859.83 million to US$4,583.75 million.28
Show the numbers
| Year | RMG exports (US$ million, nominal) |
|---|---|
| FY1983-84 | 31.57 |
| FY1984-85 | 116.2 |
| FY1985-86 | 131.48 |
| FY1986-87 | 298.67 |
| FY1987-88 | 433.92 |
| FY1988-89 | 471.09 |
| FY1989-90 | 624.16 |
| FY1990-91 | 866.82 |
| FY1991-92 | 1,182.57 |
| FY1992-93 | 1,445.02 |
| FY1993-94 | 1,555.79 |
| FY1994-95 | 2,228.35 |
| FY1995-96 | 2,547.13 |
| FY1996-97 | 3,001.25 |
| FY1997-98 | 3,781.94 |
| FY1998-99 | 4,019.98 |
| FY1999-00 | 4,349.41 |
| FY2000-01 | 4,859.83 |
| FY2001-02 | 4,583.75 |
| FY2002-03 | 4,912.09 |
| FY2003-04 | 5,686.09 |
| FY2004-05 | 6,417.67 |
Source: Export Promotion Bureau data compiled by BGMEA. Fiscal years run July to June.29
By the early 1990s garments were already the country's main export. A UNICEF and ILO synthesis reports that garments made up 70 per cent of exports in the early 1990s, that in 1992 there were 1,500 factories employing 750,000 mainly female workers, and that the United States took more than half of export earnings.30 Bangladesh's share of world clothing exports, in WTO data, rose from 0.0 per cent in 1980 to 0.6 per cent in 1990 and 2.6 per cent in 2000.31
Did Bangladesh face quotas in the United States and Europe?
Bangladesh faced quotas in the United States from 1985 but, according to the World Bank, not in the European Union.32 In the Bank's words, "There was no quota restriction on the apparel exports of Bangladesh to USA until 1985 as its exports were not substantial."33 Quotas were imposed that year after triple-digit growth over the previous five years, with exports reaching US$150 million, or 1 per cent of the US market.34 After 1985 the growth of exports to the United States fell off and the quotas became binding, but total exports kept growing, and by 2000-01 Bangladesh had 3.3 per cent of the US market.35
The United States gave Bangladesh no tariff preference. The World Bank notes that in the US market Bangladeshi garments "faced quotas like everybody else and got no GSP benefits": about 46 per cent of its clothing exports by value paid duties of 15.1 to 20 per cent, and another 13 per cent paid more than 25 per cent.36 In 2003, on the Bank's figures, Bangladesh paid more tariff revenue to the United States on about US$2 billion of exports than France paid on US$26 billion.37
Europe was different. The World Bank states that the EU "granted quota-free (as well as duty free) access to LDC products", the least developed countries.38 Exports to the EU were much smaller than to the United States through the 1980s, but by 2002-03 Bangladesh's garment exports to the EU were 43 per cent greater than its exports to the United States.39 The Bank judges that this faster growth "was no doubt helped by the absence of quotas that restricted exports of competing countries".40
The EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement followed in 2001.41 Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 amended the EU's GSP regulation "so as to extend duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries", and applied from 5 March 2001.42 It covered all products from LDCs except arms and munitions, with phased transitions only for bananas, rice and sugar.43 The World Bank calls this a real advantage because EU tariffs on garments for other countries were "generally quite high": on an MFN tariff of 12.5 per cent, an LDC product had a price advantage of 10 per cent over a competitor using the ordinary GSP and 12.5 per cent over one with no preference.44
The preference was not automatic. Duty-free access was "subject to certain stringent rules of origin", and estimates of how much woven clothing actually qualified differ: local EU officials told the World Bank that about a quarter of woven exports to the EU received GSP treatment, while BGMEA put the figure at 16 per cent in 2004.45 Other markets also gave access. A 2004 US International Trade Commission report, quoted by the World Bank, noted Bangladesh's "duty-free access to major world import markets, including the EU, Canada, and Norway", and by 2005 Australia and New Zealand had also given zero-tariff access.46 Today's trade rules are covered in the chapter on tariffs, trade preferences and LDC graduation.
What was the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing?
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing was the WTO agreement that replaced the MFA in 1995 and set out a ten-year timetable for bringing textiles and clothing back under normal GATT rules.47 It worked in two ways at once. Each importing country had to "integrate" a rising share of products, meaning that quotas on them ended, and the growth rates of the quotas that remained were increased at each stage.48
| Stage | Start | Minimum share of 1990 imports integrated | Increase in quota growth rate | WTO illustrative annual quota growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 January 1995 | 16% | +16% | 6.96% |
| 2 | 1 January 1998 | 17% | +25% | 8.7% |
| 3 | 1 January 2002 | 18% | +27% | 11.05% |
| 4 | 1 January 2005 | Remaining products (up to 49%) | Quotas end | None |
Source: ATC Articles 2.6, 2.8, 2.13 and 2.14; WTO illustrative schedule, based on a base growth rate of 7 per cent.49
The legal text set firm minimums. On entry into force each member had to integrate products accounting for "not less than 16 per cent" of its 1990 import volume, then at least 17 per cent more at the 37th month and 18 per cent more at the 85th month, with full integration at the 121st month.50 Article 1.2 asked members to allow "meaningful increases in access possibilities for small suppliers" and new entrants, and the preamble says that "special treatment should be accorded to the least-developed country Members".51 Transitional safeguards were allowed on products not yet integrated, but were to be "applied as sparingly as possible".52 A Textiles Monitoring Body, made up of a chairman and ten members acting in a personal capacity, supervised the agreement.53
The agreement had a fixed end. Article 9 states that it and all restrictions under it "shall stand terminated" on the first day of the 121st month, and adds: "There shall be no extension of this Agreement."54 On 1 January 2005 the sector was fully integrated into GATT rules, the Textiles Monitoring Body ceased to exist, and, in the WTO's words, "The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing no longer exists".55
The products freed in 2002 gave an early sign of what full liberalisation might bring. The World Bank, citing a 2004 Ministry of Commerce study, reports that products freed from quota in 2002 were seen as an early indicator: prices of these items from China fell 44 per cent in the United States and 42 per cent in the EU, US imports from China in those categories rose 290 per cent and EU imports 162 per cent, and US imports of the same items from the rest of the world fell 14 per cent.56 After 2005, safeguards agreed with China limited growth in its textile and apparel exports to up to 7.5 per cent a year, and were due to be phased out by 2008.57
What was the Harkin bill, and how did it affect child labour in Bangladesh?
The "Harkin bill" was the Child Labor Deterrence Act, a proposal in the US Senate to ban imports of goods made with child labour, which threatened Bangladesh's largest garment market. A bill of that name, S. 3133, was before the Senate in 1992, with its text and remarks printed in the Congressional Record on 5 August.58 Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa introduced S. 613, the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993, on 18 March 1993; its stated purpose was "To prohibit the importation of goods produced abroad with child labor, and for other purposes."59 It was referred to the Committee on Finance.60
Neither bill became law, but the threat changed the industry. The UNICEF and ILO synthesis records that "Though this legislation was never passed, the BGMEA responded by urging its members to remove under-age workers", in line with the minimum age of 14 in the Factory Act.61 In 1992 about 10 per cent of the industry's 750,000 workers were under 14.62 An ILO study found that 70 per cent of child workers in the industry were girls, typically recruited informally at around age 11, with a mean age of 13.63 The chapter on women in the industry covers the wider female workforce.
Abrupt dismissals began in 1993.64 How many children lost their jobs is not known. The synthesis says only: "It was reported that as many as 40,000 to 50,000 children were laid off."65 No head count supports that figure, and the first systematic survey, carried out two years later, found 9,546 children under 14 in garment factories.66 BGMEA set itself a deadline of 31 October 1994 for a child-labour-free industry, but in 1994-95 it was persuaded to set this aside in favour of a phased programme.67
What was the 1995 child labour memorandum of understanding, and did it work?
The memorandum of understanding (MOU) was an agreement signed on 4 July 1995 by BGMEA, the ILO and UNICEF, and endorsed by the Government of Bangladesh, to remove children from garment factories in phases, with schooling in place.68 It had five parts: a fact-finding survey; restraint on new recruitment of children; a temporary halt to dismissals until schooling was in place; non-formal education with stipends; and monitoring and verification.69 Skills training and credit were added in 2000, and the US embassy sat on the informal steering committee as an observer.70
UNICEF led the education side, opening the first non-formal education centres in January 1996 and running more than 300 with the NGO partners GSS and BRAC; the ILO led monitoring, which was fully working by late 1996.71 From December 1996, 12 monitoring teams were in operation, each with two ILO monitors, one government monitor and one BGMEA monitor, and no trade union or NGO members.72 A second MOU was signed in July 2000 for 12 months.73
The programme missed its first deadlines. The MOU set 31 October 1995 as the target date for removing all children, and it was not met.74 After slow progress the US embassy set a new deadline of October 1996, and an intensive six-week drive identified 5,674 child workers.75 Between August 1995 and December 2001 ILO monitoring identified 27,951 children; by the end of 2001, 336 MOU schools had enrolled 8,509 of them, about 30 per cent.76 About 4,000 children had received skills training by the end of 2003.77 The partners invested about US$3.8 million in the programme from 1995 to 2001.78
| Year | Factories monitored | Factories employing children | Share of factories (%) | Monitoring visits | Children found |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 | 2,189 | 5,770 | |||
| 1997 | 1,778 | 451 | 25.36 | 5,643 | 3,057 |
| 1998 | 1,905 | 315 | 16.53 | 7,681 | 1,240 |
| 1999 | 1,925 | 176 | 9.14 | 7,373 | 534 |
| 2000 | 2,215 | 255 | 11.25 | 8,079 | 908 |
| 2001 | 2,265 | 151 | 6.66 | 8,249 | 428 |
| 2002 | 2,283 | 72 | 3.15 | 7,076 | 155 |
| 2003 (to 30 September) | 2,281 | 22 | 0.96 | 6,659 | 48 |
Source: ILO-IPEC final evaluation (2004), appendices 3b and 3c.79
By its own measure, the programme largely worked inside BGMEA factories. The share of monitored factories employing children fell from 25.36 per cent in 1997 to 0.96 per cent in the first nine months of 2003.80 The UNICEF and ILO synthesis concludes: "Child labour in BGMEA factories is now virtually zero, though it has not completely disappeared."81 The monitoring covered BGMEA member factories only, and the state's own capacity did not grow: there were 64 labour inspectors for 20,000 registered factories.82
For the children themselves, the results were mixed. Children in MOU schools received a stipend of Tk 300 a month, while a child worker could earn around Tk 1,000 with overtime; by the end of the programme the stipend was perhaps a third of basic earnings.83 About 80 per cent of retrenched children reported eating less after losing their jobs.84 Six per cent reported being forced into hazardous work such as brick chipping, cart pushing and rickshaw pulling, and about 1 per cent of girls surveyed who had not enrolled or had dropped out knew of young female workers forced into prostitution; the synthesis judges that hazardous work, including sex work, was "probably much less than was portrayed in the media".85
Why did knitwear grow faster than woven garments in the 1990s?
According to the World Bank, knitwear grew faster for three reasons: integrated knit plants were cheap to set up, EU rules of origin changed, and the government paid a cash incentive on garments made from local fabric and yarn.89 Calculated from BGMEA's data, knit garments were 14.2 per cent of RMG exports in FY1992-93 (US$204.54 million of US$1,445.02 million) and 43.9 per cent in FY2004-05 (US$2,819.47 million of US$6,417.67 million).90 The World Bank notes that from FY1993-94 to FY2003-04 knit exports grew by more than 23 per cent a year, against 10.6 per cent for woven garments.91
Show the numbers
| Year | Woven | Knit |
|---|---|---|
| FY1992-93 | 1,240.48 | 204.54 |
| FY1993-94 | 1,291.65 | 264.14 |
| FY1994-95 | 1,835.09 | 393.26 |
| FY1995-96 | 1,948.81 | 598.32 |
| FY1996-97 | 2,237.95 | 763.3 |
| FY1997-98 | 2,844.43 | 937.51 |
| FY1998-99 | 2,984.96 | 1,035.02 |
| FY1999-00 | 3,081.19 | 1,268.22 |
| FY2000-01 | 3,364.32 | 1,495.51 |
| FY2001-02 | 3,124.82 | 1,458.93 |
| FY2002-03 | 3,258.27 | 1,653.82 |
| FY2003-04 | 3,538.07 | 2,148.02 |
| FY2004-05 | 3,598.2 | 2,819.47 |
Source: Export Promotion Bureau data compiled by BGMEA.92
In more detail, the World Bank's three reasons are these: integrated knit plants needed relatively little investment; the EU's GSP rules of origin changed "from three to two stages"; and from 1993-94 the government paid cash incentives on exports of garments made with locally produced fabric from local yarn.93 The incentive fell from 30 per cent "a few years ago" to 5 per cent by 2005, and was due to end in July 2005.94 Read alongside the low share of woven exports that qualified for GSP treatment, this suggests that knitwear made from local fabric found the EU's rules of origin easier to meet.
A domestic supply industry grew behind the knit factories. Local fabric sales to garment makers rose from 45 million square metres in FY1993-94 to more than a billion in FY2002-03, and nearly 80 per cent went to knitwear by 2001-02.95 Local producers supplied 65 per cent of knit fabric demand by 2001-02; BKMEA claimed more than 90 per cent by 2005; and local spinners met about 60 to 70 per cent of knit yarn demand.96 Spinning capacity trebled from 1.4 million to 4.2 million spindles between 1994 and 2004, according to BTMA figures, and knit fabric output rose from 385 million to 990 million metres between FY1997-98 and FY2003-04.97
Knitwear's market was Europe. In FY2004-05 more than 79 per cent of knitwear exports went to the EU, 14 per cent to the United States and 4 per cent to Canada; woven exports went 47 per cent to the EU, 45 per cent to the United States and 5 per cent to Canada.98 The knitwear makers formed their own association. BKMEA, the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association, "was established in 1996 by a group of manufacturers"; its head office is in Narayanganj and it reports about 2,540 member factories today.99 In 1998 the National Board of Revenue (NBR) allowed BKMEA to issue Utilization Declarations to its members.100 The chapter on where the factories are explains the knitwear cluster around Narayanganj.
The industry was large and concentrated by the end of the quota era. BGMEA's 2004-05 directory listed 4,300 firms, 700 of them knit, 525 sweater and 2,275 woven, of which about 1,300 were closed or inactive; BKMEA had 860 knitwear members, about 300 of whom also belonged to BGMEA.101 The World Bank's adjusted estimate for 2004 was 3,560 active firms, 47 per cent woven, 42 per cent knitwear and 11 per cent sweaters, employing about 1.9 million production workers.102 In 2004 the largest 500 of 2,387 exporting firms supplied 74.3 per cent of garment exports.103
What happened to Bangladesh's garment exports when quotas ended in 2005?
Bangladesh's garment exports kept growing when quotas ended, despite widespread forecasts of decline. The World Bank's verdict, written in December 2005, was that "RMG exports from Bangladesh in the post-MFA world did not decline": RMG exports grew 13 per cent in FY2004-05, and knit garments 31 per cent.104
The forecasts had been gloomy. An IMF working paper by Montfort Mlachila and Yongzheng Yang, published in June 2004, concluded that Bangladesh "could face significant pressure on its balance of payments, output, and employment when the quotas are eliminated".105 The US International Trade Commission wrote in 2004, as quoted by the World Bank, that "The status of Bangladesh as an overall supplier to U.S. market is uncertain".106 The World Bank observed that "Most analysts regard Bangladesh as 'vulnerable'", and that some predicted China could take as much as 50 per cent of the global market.107 General equilibrium modelling for the World Bank (Manole 2005) predicted losses of unskilled labour in Bangladesh of 17 per cent in apparel and 5 per cent in textiles, and welfare costs of up to US$370 million over three to four years.108
The first months of free trade told a different story in the US market. Between January to July 2004 and the same months of 2005, US imports of MFA apparel from Bangladesh rose 21.5 per cent by value and 19.8 per cent by volume.109 Knitwear exports to the United States jumped 70 per cent in January to June 2005, and BKMEA reported full order books.110
| Exporter | Jan to Jul 2004 | Jan to Jul 2005 | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| World | 35,466 | 38,827 | 9.5 |
| China | 4,673 | 9,081 | 94.3 |
| India | 1,324 | 1,780 | 34.4 |
| Bangladesh | 1,056 | 1,284 | 21.5 |
| Sri Lanka | 817 | 951 | 16.4 |
| Cambodia | 777 | 888 | 14.2 |
| Viet Nam | 1,454 | 1,440 | -0.9 |
| Hong Kong | 1,934 | 1,444 | -25.3 |
Source: US Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) data, in World Bank (2005), table 5.111
Why were the models wrong? The World Bank found that rerunning its model with a higher export-tax equivalent gave results closer to what happened, which suggests that "MFA quotas were more binding for Bangladesh than presumed".112 In other words, the quotas had held Bangladesh back more than the modellers assumed, so their removal helped it more. The Bank's foreword put it plainly: "Contrary to dire predictions of some analysts, the end of the MFA has not dampened the competitive spirit" of garment entrepreneurs.113 BGMEA's own account says the phase-out was predicted to "incur a massive upset in our export. However, the post-MFA era is another story of success."114
Growth continued after the first year. RMG exports reached US$7.90 billion in FY2005-06, a calculated 23.1 per cent more than in FY2004-05.115 Bangladesh's share of world clothing exports rose from 2.5 per cent in 2005 to 4.2 per cent in 2010 in later WTO editions; the WTO's 2011 edition gave 4.5 per cent for 2010.116 What happened next is told in the chapter on growth after the quotas.
Key dates
- 1974The Multi-Fibre Arrangement begins to govern trade in textiles and clothing.119
- Early 1980sBonded warehouses introduced for export garment makers.120
- 1985The United States imposes quotas on Bangladeshi clothing after exports rise to US$150 million (1 per cent of the US market), according to the World Bank.121
- FY1990-91Garments pass half of Bangladesh's exports (50.47 per cent).122
- FY1991-92RMG exports pass US$1 billion.123
- 5 August 1992The Child Labor Deterrence Act (S. 3133) appears in the Congressional Record.124
- 18 March 1993Senator Tom Harkin introduces S. 613, the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993.125
- 1993Dismissals of child workers begin; 40,000 to 50,000 are reported laid off.126
- 1 January 1995The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing takes effect; stage 1 integrates 16 per cent of products.127
- 4 July 1995BGMEA, the ILO and UNICEF sign the child labour MOU.128
- August to November 1995First survey finds 9,546 children under 14 in garment factories.129
- January 1996First MOU non-formal schools open.130
- 1996BKMEA is established.131
- 1 January 1998ATC stage 2 (17 per cent).132
- July 2000A second MOU is signed for 12 months.133
- 28 February 2001EU adopts Regulation 416/2001, Everything But Arms; it applies from 5 March 2001.134
- 1 January 2002ATC stage 3 (18 per cent).135
- June 2004IMF working paper warns of pressure on Bangladesh's balance of payments, output and jobs.136
- 1 January 2005The last quotas end and the ATC terminates.137
- December 2005World Bank reports that Bangladesh's garment exports did not decline after the MFA.138
Further reading
Yung Whee Rhee's article in World Development is the classic account of how a partner from a quota-restricted country seeded the industry.139 Munir Quddus and Salim Rashid's Entrepreneurs and Economic Development is the book-length history of the entrepreneurs of the quota years.140 For child labour, Michael Nielsen's article in International Affairs is the main academic analysis of the Harkin bill crisis and the 1995 MOU.141 Khondoker Abdul Mottaleb and Tetsushi Sonobe explain the industry's growth through knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurs' human capital, and Mohammad Yunus and Tatsufumi Yamagata argue that market forces outweighed quotas and policy controls.142 Cornelia Staritz's Making the Cut?, published by the World Bank in December 2010 and often cited as 2011, asks how low-income exporters fared once the quotas had gone.143 The World Bank's 2005 paper on the end of MFA quotas, which compares the model forecasts with the first results after 2005, is the main source for this chapter's account of the transition.144
Questions students and journalists ask
What was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement?
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was the framework that governed world trade in textiles and clothing from 1974. Under it, importing countries set quotas limiting imports, through bilateral agreements or unilateral action. The World Bank says developed countries set it up to protect their own industries from more efficient producers in developing countries, particularly in Asia. It was replaced in 1995 by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and the last quotas ended on 1 January 2005.
How did the Multi-Fibre Arrangement help Bangladesh?
Quotas limited established exporters such as South Korea, so buyers and producers looked for countries that were not yet restricted. Bangladesh's first major export garment venture was set up with Daewoo of South Korea soon after the MFA came into force. The World Bank says the quotas gave Bangladesh sheltered access to the US and EU markets, and BGMEA calls the quota system a blessing that let the industry take root.
When did the US first put quotas on Bangladeshi garments?
The United States first imposed quotas on Bangladeshi clothing in 1985. According to the World Bank, there had been no quota before then because exports were not substantial, but after five years of triple-digit growth they had risen to US$150 million, or 1 per cent of the US market. After 1985 exports to the US grew more slowly, though by 2000-01 Bangladesh held 3.3 per cent of the US market.
What is Everything But Arms and when did it start?
Everything But Arms (EBA) is the European Union's arrangement giving the least developed countries duty-free and quota-free access for all products except arms and munitions. It was created by Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 and applied from 5 March 2001. Bananas, rice and sugar were phased in later. The World Bank says it gave Bangladesh a real price advantage in the EU because ordinary EU tariffs on clothing were high.
What happened to Bangladesh's garment exports when quotas ended in 2005?
They kept growing. The World Bank found that Bangladesh's garment exports did not decline after the MFA: they grew 13 per cent in FY2004-05, with knitwear up 31 per cent, and US imports of MFA apparel from Bangladesh rose 21.5 per cent by value in January to July 2005. In FY2005-06 garment exports reached US$7.90 billion, 23.1 per cent more than the year before.
Did experts predict Bangladesh's garment industry would collapse after the MFA?
Many predicted serious losses. A 2004 IMF working paper warned of significant pressure on Bangladesh's balance of payments, output and employment, and the World Bank noted that most analysts regarded Bangladesh as vulnerable. World Bank modelling forecast a 17 per cent loss of unskilled labour in apparel. The Bank later concluded that quotas had been more binding on Bangladesh than assumed, so their removal helped it more than expected.
What was the Harkin bill?
The Harkin bill was the Child Labor Deterrence Act, a proposed US law to ban imports of goods made with child labour. A bill of that name, S. 3133, was before the Senate in 1992, and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa introduced S. 613 on 18 March 1993. Neither became law, but BGMEA responded by urging its members to remove workers under 14, and abrupt dismissals of children began in 1993.
How many children lost their jobs in Bangladesh garment factories in 1993?
Nobody knows exactly. A 2004 UNICEF and ILO synthesis says it was reported that as many as 40,000 to 50,000 children were laid off, but no count supports this. The first systematic survey, carried out by the ILO, UNICEF and BGMEA between August and November 1995, found 9,546 children under 14 still working in garment factories.
What was the 1995 BGMEA, ILO and UNICEF memorandum of understanding?
It was an agreement signed on 4 July 1995 by BGMEA, the ILO and UNICEF, and endorsed by the government, to remove children from garment factories in a planned way. It included a survey, a halt to new child recruitment, a pause on dismissals until schools were ready, non-formal schooling with a monthly stipend of Tk 300, and factory monitoring by joint ILO, government and BGMEA teams.
Did the child labour MOU in Bangladesh work?
Inside BGMEA factories, largely yes. ILO monitors found child labour in 25.36 per cent of monitored factories in 1997 and 0.96 per cent in 2003. But BGMEA's claim that the industry was free of child labour in 1995 is not supported by this data. Only about 30 per cent of identified children enrolled in MOU schools, and about 80 per cent of retrenched children reported eating less after losing their jobs.
Notes
- World Trade Organization, "Understanding the WTO: The Agreements. Textiles: Back in the Mainstream," Geneva: WTO, accessed 22 November 2026, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm5_e.htm; World Bank, End of MFA Quotas: Key Issues and Strategic Options for Bangladesh Readymade Garment Industry, Bangladesh Development Series Paper No. 2 (Dhaka: World Bank Office, December 2005), para. 5.12, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/396141468006268777/pdf/355510BDS20MFA11PUBLIC1.pdf. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 5.13-5.14; Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance, Data source Export Promotion Bureau, compiled by BGMEA (Dhaka: BGMEA, 2026), https://www.bgmea.com.bd/page/Export_Performance. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Legal text (Geneva: WTO, 1994), art. 9, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex_e.htm; World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 2.12. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour in the Bangladesh Garment Industry 1995-2001: A Synthesis of UNICEF and ILO Evaluation Studies of the Bangladesh Garment Sector Projects (New York and Geneva: UNICEF and ILO, August 2004), section 2, https://webapps.ilo.org/ievaldiscovery/files/file/155827. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III: Continuing the Child Labour Monitoring and Education Components and Prepare for the Integration into a Broader Project in the Garment Export Industry in Bangladesh (BGD/00/52/USA). A Final Evaluation by an Independent Evaluation Team (Geneva: ILO-IPEC Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section, April 2004), section 1.2.1, https://webapps.ilo.org/ievaldiscovery/files/file/152820. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 9. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Bank, End of MFA Quotas; UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour; ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III; Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.12. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.12. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 5.12, 5.14. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.13. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 4.4 and annex B. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 2.2. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 7.65. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), "About Garment Industry of Bangladesh," Dhaka: BGMEA, accessed 22 November 2026, https://www.bgmea.com.bd/page/AboutGarmentsIndustry. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 5.9-5.10. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance; World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 4. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2011, Table II.69, "Leading exporters and importers of clothing, 2010" (Geneva: WTO, 2011), table II.69, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011_e/its2011_e.pdf. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 5.14-5.15. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, ch. IV. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, note 12. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.15. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.15. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.15. ↩
- Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 so as to extend duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries, Official Journal of the European Communities L 60, 1 March 2001, 43-50 (28 February 2001), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001R0416. ↩
- Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001. ↩
- Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 5.15, 7.66, table 17. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 7.65, note 38. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 6, box 2. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, arts. 2.6, 2.8, 2.13-2.14. ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, arts. 2.6-2.14; World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, arts. 2.6, 2.8. ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 1.2 and preamble. ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 6.1. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 9. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Trade Organization, "Textiles," Topic page. Geneva: WTO, accessed 22 November 2026, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 4.3. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, note 5, exec. summary. ↩
- US Congress, Congressional Record Index 1992, "Child Labor Deterrence Act" (S. 3133) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRI-1992/html/CRI-1992-CHILD-LABOR-DETERRENCE-ACT.htm. ↩
- US Congress. Senate, Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993, S. 613, 103rd Cong., 1st sess. Introduced 18 March 1993 (18 March 1993), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-103s613is. ↩
- US Congress. Senate, Child Labor Deterrence Act. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, section 1.2.1. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, sections 2-3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3, note 5. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, section 1.2. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, section 1.2.2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.1. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 7.5. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, appendices 3b-3c. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, appendix 3b. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.3. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 6.4. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 7.2. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 7.1. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), "About Garment Industry of". ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, appendix 3b. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2; ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, section 1.2.1. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 7.38-7.40. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, box 2. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 7.38-7.40. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 7.40. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 7.36-7.37. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 7.38, 7.61. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 7.61. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, box 2. ↩
- Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA), "BKMEA at a Glance," Narayanganj: BKMEA, accessed 22 November 2026, https://bkmea.com/about/at-a-glance. ↩
- Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA), "Home page ("Online UD")," Narayanganj: BKMEA, accessed 22 November 2026, https://www.bkmea.com/. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.1. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 7. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 8. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 2.12, table 4. ↩
- Montfort Mlachila and Yongzheng Yang, The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of the Impact on Bangladesh, IMF Working Paper 04/108 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, June 2004), https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/2004-108.html. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 6. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, paras. 2.13, 4.3. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 3, exec. summary para. 7. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 5. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 2.12. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, table 5. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, note 6. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, foreword. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), "About Garment Industry of". ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2017, Table A23, "Top 10 exporters and importers of clothing, 2016" (Geneva: WTO, 2017), table A23, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts2017_e.pdf; World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2019, Table A.23, "Top 10 exporters and importers of clothing, 2018" (Geneva: WTO, 2019), table A.23, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2019_e/wts2019_e.pdf; World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2011, table II.69. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2011, table II.69; World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review, table A23. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.12. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.9. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 5.14. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Export Performance. ↩
- US Congress, Congressional Record Index 1992. ↩
- US Congress. Senate, Child Labor Deterrence Act. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 2.6. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 2. ↩
- ILO-IPEC, ILO/IPEC BGMEA Phase III, section 1.2.1. ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3. ↩
- Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA), "BKMEA at a Glance". ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization, Addressing Child Labour, section 3. ↩
- Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream". ↩
- Mlachila and Yang, End of Textiles Quotas. ↩
- World Trade Organization, "Textiles: Back in the Mainstream"; World Trade Organization, Agreement on Textiles and, art. 9. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas, para. 2.12. ↩
- Yung Whee Rhee, "The Catalyst Model of Development: Lessons from Bangladesh's Success with Garment Exports," World Development 18, no. 2 (1990), https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90057-5. ↩
- Munir Quddus and Salim Rashid, Entrepreneurs and Economic Development: The Remarkable Story of Garment Exports from Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000). ↩
- Michael E. Nielsen, "The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and Child Labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry," International Affairs 81, no. 3 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00469.x. ↩
- Khondoker Abdul Mottaleb and Tetsushi Sonobe, "An Inquiry into the Rapid Growth of the Garment Industry in Bangladesh," Economic Development and Cultural Change 60, no. 1 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1086/661218; Mohammad Yunus and Tatsufumi Yamagata, "Bangladesh: Market Force Supersedes Control," in The Garment Industry in Low-Income Countries, ed. Takahiro Fukunishi and Tatsufumi Yamagata (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137383181_3. ↩
- Cornelia Staritz, Making the Cut? Low-Income Countries and the Global Clothing Value Chain in a Post-Quota and Post-Crisis World (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8636-1. ↩
- World Bank, End of MFA Quotas. ↩
Bibliography
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). "About Garment Industry of Bangladesh." Dhaka: BGMEA. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://www.bgmea.com.bd/page/AboutGarmentsIndustry.
- Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). Export Performance. Data source Export Promotion Bureau, compiled by BGMEA. Dhaka: BGMEA, 2026. https://www.bgmea.com.bd/page/Export_Performance.
- Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA). "BKMEA at a Glance." Narayanganj: BKMEA. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://bkmea.com/about/at-a-glance.
- Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA). "Home page ("Online UD")." Narayanganj: BKMEA. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://www.bkmea.com/.
- Council of the European Union. Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 so as to extend duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries. Official Journal of the European Communities L 60, 1 March 2001, 43-50. 28 February 2001. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001R0416.
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- Mottaleb, Khondoker Abdul, and Tetsushi Sonobe. "An Inquiry into the Rapid Growth of the Garment Industry in Bangladesh." Economic Development and Cultural Change 60, no. 1 (2011): 67-89. https://doi.org/10.1086/661218.
- Nielsen, Michael E. "The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and Child Labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry." International Affairs 81, no. 3 (2005): 559-80. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00469.x.
- Quddus, Munir, and Salim Rashid. Entrepreneurs and Economic Development: The Remarkable Story of Garment Exports from Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000.
- Rhee, Yung Whee. "The Catalyst Model of Development: Lessons from Bangladesh's Success with Garment Exports." World Development 18, no. 2 (1990): 333-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90057-5.
- Staritz, Cornelia. Making the Cut? Low-Income Countries and the Global Clothing Value Chain in a Post-Quota and Post-Crisis World. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8636-1.
- UNICEF and International Labour Organization. Addressing Child Labour in the Bangladesh Garment Industry 1995-2001: A Synthesis of UNICEF and ILO Evaluation Studies of the Bangladesh Garment Sector Projects. New York and Geneva: UNICEF and ILO, August 2004. https://webapps.ilo.org/ievaldiscovery/files/file/155827.
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- US Congress. Senate. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993. S. 613, 103rd Cong., 1st sess. Introduced 18 March 1993. 18 March 1993. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-103s613is.
- World Bank. End of MFA Quotas: Key Issues and Strategic Options for Bangladesh Readymade Garment Industry. Bangladesh Development Series Paper No. 2. Dhaka: World Bank Office, December 2005. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/396141468006268777/pdf/355510BDS20MFA11PUBLIC1.pdf.
- World Trade Organization. "Textiles." Topic page. Geneva: WTO. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm.
- World Trade Organization. "Understanding the WTO: The Agreements. Textiles: Back in the Mainstream." Geneva: WTO. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm5_e.htm.
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Chicago (notes and bibliography)
Rahman, AB. "The Multi-Fibre Arrangement and Bangladesh: The Quota Years, 1974 to 2004." Collective Studio, 22 November 2026. https://collectivestudioltd.com/research/bangladesh-garment-industry/multi-fibre-arrangement.
Harvard
Rahman, A.B. (2026) The Multi-Fibre Arrangement and Bangladesh: The Quota Years, 1974 to 2004. Collective Studio. Available at: https://collectivestudioltd.com/research/bangladesh-garment-industry/multi-fibre-arrangement (Accessed: [date you read it]).
APA 7th edition
Rahman, A. B. (2026, November 22). The Multi-Fibre Arrangement and Bangladesh: The Quota Years, 1974 to 2004. Collective Studio. https://collectivestudioltd.com/research/bangladesh-garment-industry/multi-fibre-arrangement
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